This presentation discusses, from a Peircean semiotic perspective, (1) the logic of algorithms employed by Facebook to foster audience engagement, as it relates to the spreadability of fake news in the context of transmedia journalism, and (2) how our own methods of fixation of beliefs influence the process by which fake news is spread. The methodological approach encompasses a qualitative conceptual study of Peircean semiotics (Peirce, 1931-1935/1958, 1980-2000), focusing on concepts such as truth, reality, representation, fixation of beliefs, and collateral experiences, as a proposition to investigate the relationship between algorithms (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Bakir & McStay, 2018; Dubois & Blank, 2018), fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Tandoc et al., 2018), and transmedia journalism (Gambarato & Alzamora, 2018; Wiggins, 2017). Across the humanities and in diverse studies, scholars are applying Peirce’s ideas to issues and areas beyond those he addressed in his own work (Fabbrichesi & Marietti, 2006). The goal is to apply the philosophical tools developed by Peirce to “the treatment of new problems and the formulation of new themes” (Fabbrichesi & Marietti, 2006, p. xiv), such as the ones investigated here. The research findings, following Peirce’s a priori method that fixes beliefs that are agreeable to reason and eliminate doubt, indicate that we may believe in what we are inclined to believe. Stories that conform to what we already believe are taken as true, regardless if they correspond to experience or not. They eliminate the uncertainty of the uncomfortable state of doubt. This is very similar to what happens with filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) and echo chambers on social media in general and on Facebook in particular. Even though there is a manipulative role played by the configuration of algorithms on Facebook, our own cognitive preferences lead us to develop contexts in which filter bubbles and echo chambers are stimulated, creating a fertile terrain for fake news to grow.