The philosophical debate on the nature of narrative has been mainly concerned with literary narratives, whereas forms of non-literary and especially pictorial narrativity have been somewhat neglected. In this paper, however, I shall discuss narrativity specifically with regard to pictorial objects. It may reasonably be assumed that narrative interpretations of e.g. pictorial art frequently, more or less, result from and may be assimilated by narrative mental representations and expectations that are often shared by a relatively large group of beholders. Approaches from cognitive psychology, such as the work of Jean Matter Mandler (1984), Jerome Bruner (1990), or Roger Schank (1995; 1999), suggest that cognition crucially depends on the storage and retrieval of action scripts or schemata, that is, narrative structures, that may occur on various levels of abstraction. These schemas incorporate generalized knowledge about event sequences, such as the order in which specific events will take place; causal, enabling, or conventionalized relations between these events, and what kind of events occur in certain action sequences. There also are scene schemas that are characterized by spatial rather than temporal relations. This means that we have mentally stored inventory information, that is, what kinds of objects normally appear in certain situations, as well as spatial-relation information, which concerns the usual spatial layout of a scene. Through previous experiences we acquire a large quantity of culturally based event and scene stereotypes, along with idiosyncratic variations, either from our previously acquired, direct familiarity with instances of events, or through our acquaintance with written, oral, and, of course, pictorial descriptions of them, such as religious or mythological tales. They include settings, sub-goals, and actions in attempting to reach specific goals. I shall claim that the production and comprehension of pictorial signs is frequently based on the existence and activation of such mentally stored action and scene schemas on the part of the beholders. In this paper, also based upon more recent research on script theory, I will present some examples of pictorial objects where narrative structures become activated and, indeed, their recognizability and comprehensibility as such presuppose mental script representations as outlined above. References: Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of Meaning, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. Mandler, J. M. (1984). Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory, London/Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. Schank, R. C. (1995). Tell Me a Story - Narrative and Intelligence, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern UP. Schank, R. C. (1999). Dynamic Memory Revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge UP.