In the 1980s, the Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica (1909-1987) elaborated a hermeneutical logic (Hermes’s Logic) of the whole that is found in the part and he presented the synalethism as a fundamental logical form of this logic. The synalethism, born out of the need to describe the mechanism of comprehension, is a chaining that proves conformity with the truth, in which every meaning is opened to new meanings. Starting from the discovery of the similarity between this logical scheme and the unlimited semiosis scheme, seen as a form of opening (also suggested by Eco in the Opera aperta), I will try to show, in this paper, that if unlimited semiosis is subjected to the rigors of synalethism - firstly by imposing the strict logical relations among the individual, the determinations and the general - it would be possible/easier to avoid its involvement in the hermetic and the deconstructionist drift, even if we accept that through unlimited semiosis cannot be reached the truth (αλήθεια), but only paradigms can be established. I will also show that by implicating the virtues of unlimited semiosis in synalethism - infinite regression and the capitalization of circularity - we can bring back into discussions the links between logical semiotics and mereology and we can even rethink the formation of mereological semiotics (starting from Husserl). In my opinion, the logical semiotics is not just a metalogic but also a specific logic in which the part and the whole are in an endless/continuous relationship that cannot be fully formalized. It is a philosophical logic that, along with the hermeneutical logic, wants meanings first of all, not knowledge. Also, in my view, the mereological semiotics does not usurp the specific of the logical semiotics, just as the mereology does not usurp the role played by the general theory of relations. Finally, I suggest a logical form that could be functional in logical semiotics by combining the two processes - synalethism and unlimited semiosis. This operation would allow the development of large articulations that go beyond the concatenation of simple sentences, as in syllogism, and will avoid the fixation of a conclusion, keeping the fluidity of a logical becoming.